Survivors of a train crash near Bedford are calling for the introduction of safety system that could have averted disaster – after it emerged the driver who was killed in the collision accelerated through a red signal moments beforehand.
East Midlands Railway (EMR) driver Shaun Burton, 60, was killed after his Class 360 Luton Express ploughed into the back of a Class 810 high-speed train at 50mph on June 19 south of Bedford station.
The crash also injured 160 people, 11 of them very seriously.
An interim report published today by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) found Mr Burton passed through a red signal at 58mph as he joined the same line as the train in front, which had come to an unplanned stop due to a safety system fault.
Mr Burton had been alerted to the red signal by a cabin alarm from the train's Automatic Warning System (AWS) – but, having acknowledged and silenced the alarm, continued accelerating up to 76mph.
He applied the brakes ten seconds before the crash, 850ft away from the other train - having, investigators believe, seen the other vehicle ahead. The force of the collision was so severe the length of the combined trains was shortened by 10m.
While AWS can alert a driver to danger up ahead, it cannot force a train to stop if it passes a red signal – known in the industry as a signal passed at danger, or SPAD.
Another failsafe, the Train Protection & Warning System (TPWS), can. However, as the Daily Mail reported days after the crash, Network Rail reviewed the signal at Bedford last year – and, to the anger of those hurt, decided that it did not need it.
Solicitors acting for some of those on board the trains say the crash could have been avoided had Network Rail installed TPWS on the line.
The scene of the Bedford train crash in June in which injured 160 people and killed train driver Shaun Burton
Train driver Mr Burton, 60, was killed in the crash. An interim report has found he accelerated through a red signal in the moments before he suffered fatal injuries
Des Collins, a lawyer representing a number of the crash victims, said today: 'While we recognise there is much more to be determined, it is already clear from today's report that the fact of a SPAD was compounded by a lack of TPWS on that stretch of railway.
'This system is specifically designed to automatically bring a train to a safe stop, which would have prevented this accident.
'What appears troubling is Network Rail's assessment that there was no need for a TPWS in that area which they deemed as low risk.
'Yet again, the lessons of Paddington and Southall Inquiries have failed to be implemented, to the detriment of passengers.'
Stephanie Clark, of Stewarts - another firm representing crash victims - said the role of 'human error' was an 'important finding'.
She added: 'Whilst attention today is naturally on the technical and operational causes of the collision, we will be supporting our client to translate the RAIB report into the meaningful aspects for them and the implications of it for their potential claim.'
Rolled out following fatal rail accidents including the 1997 Southall crash and the 1999 Paddington disaster, TPWS requires additional equipment to be installed on the track.
At present, Network Rail only installs it in 'high risk' areas, such as near converging railway lines – despite an inquiry recommending a full rollout on high-speed lines like those at Bedford. Estimates put the 'cost per life saved' at millions of pounds.
Railway engineers graded the line 'low risk' because there had been no SPAD events at the signal since records began in 1985.
Signals where 'rear-end' collisions were a possibility were also given an exemption from TPWS in the regulations governing its use.
Network Rail said today it could not comment on calls to introduce it on the line, citing the ongoing RAIB investigation.
Its East Midlands route director Mark Budden said in a written statement: 'We are carefully considering these interim findings and working closely with RAIB and industry partners. Keeping passengers and colleagues safe is our top priority.
'We owe it to the driver who lost his life, to those who were injured, to everyone affected by this collision, and to the millions of people who rely on our railway every day, to understand every possible lesson from it.
'We will continue to cooperate fully with the investigation and ensure those lessons shape our future decision-making.'
A final report on the crash is unlikely to be published until well into next year.
The scene of the crash. An investigation found the collision had shortened the combined length of both trains by as much as 10 metres
A railway engineer inspecting a TPWS grid. Lawyers for the injured say this system could have averted disaster at Bedford had it been installed
TPWS was rolled out on much of the UK's railway network following high-profile disasters such as the Paddington train crash in 1999 (pictured)
The RAIB says it is yet to ascertain why Mr Burton – described as a 'devoted' train driver – silenced an alarm designed to alert him to the fact he was at a red signal and continued to accelerate.
In-cabin CCTV from his train showed him acknowledge the AWS by pressing a dedicated button. He had done the same at a yellow signal, which tells a train driver to be prepared to stop at the next signal, moments before.
Digital footage captured in the seconds before the collision was corrupted by the crash, likely robbing investigators of vital clues.
Questions are also still being asked about why the front train's emergency brakes were applied automatically due to a fault with its AWS equipment – which sounded an alarm despite the track being clear ahead.
Neither the driver nor an instructor accompanying him on the journey recognised this as an AWS alarm.
Network Rail tested the on-track AWS safety systems and found no faults. But in the weeks after the crash another train reported the same issue. It was able to continue without being forced to stop after acknowledging the alarm.
In a statement, East Midlands Railway said it could not comment on the RAIB's interim report, citing the ongoing investigation.
It added: 'Our focus remains on supporting those affected by the incident, while continuing to work with the relevant authorities and carefully considering any recommendations identified through the investigation process.
'We will do everything we can to act on the lessons of this incident and take all appropriate steps to prevent something similar from happening again.'
Ultimate responsibility for railway policy falls to the Department for Transport (DfT).
A DfT spokesman told the Daily Mail: 'Our deepest sympathies remain with everyone affected by this tragic incident.
'Safety remains the absolute priority across our rail network and while incidents like this are incredibly rare, when they do occur, they are taken incredibly seriously.
'We will ensure the industry acts on any findings in the Rail Accident Investigation Branch's full report once published.'