Ukraine’s population is at its most vulnerable in years. Barely a night now goes by when Russia does not fire enormous salvos of drones and missiles at cities across the country.

Overnight on Thursday, 16 people were killed in Kyiv in an attack “combining different types of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, aiming to cause as much damage as possible to civilian infrastructure”, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Ukraine said it shot down 39 cruise missiles and 145 drones that night. However, it made no mention of how many ballistic or hypersonic missiles were launched or intercepted. This is part of a controversial new policy of not reporting ballistic interceptions. It also speaks to a stark vulnerability: Ukraine can no longer shoot them down.

How Ukraine’s ballistic missile problem got so bad

Few systems in the world can intercept ballistic missiles, which can travel enormous distances extremely quickly – often while actively manoeuvring to avoid defences.

The US Patriot system is the only means Kyiv has to defend against them, but it is running critically short on interceptor missiles. US supplies have been massively reduced by Donald Trump’s war with Iran, which has depleted up to three-fifths of its available stocks, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Europe’s stockpiles are also low, with Germany delivering just 35 to Ukraine in March. Replenishing them will take years.

Meanwhile, Moscow is keen to take advantage now.

Vadym Skibitsky, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, said Russia had restructured its defence production to prioritise ballistic missiles – in particular the 9M723 short-range ballistic missile used in the Iskander-M system and the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal.

Russia is producing some 1,440 ballistic missiles a year, while the US manufactures just 650 Patriots, according to Marc De Vore, senior lecturer at the University of St Andrews’s school of international relations and associate fellow at Chatham House.

This summer, North Korea also stepped up support for Russia by supplying ballistic missiles and personnel to launch them.

Last month, before the reporting ban, Ukraine managed to intercept only 29 out of 195 Russian ballistic missiles, with another 40 failing to reach their targets, according to Ukraine’s defence ministry. This month is likely to be even worse.

Despite Ukraine’s struggles, the US has given conflicting signals about granting it a licence to produce Patriot missiles domestically. Ukraine is busy developing its own anti-ballistic missile system, Freya, alongside European allies, as a lower-cost alternative. However, both schemes will take years to bear fruit.

‘Ukraine must look beyond purely defensive measures’

Increasingly, experts say that if Ukraine cannot shoot the arrow, it must shoot the archer instead.

“With no reliable short-term solutions to the lack of Patriot interceptors, Ukraine must look beyond purely defensive measures and explore potential offensive options,” said Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank in Kyiv.

Ukraine is already targeting military sites in Russia, including ballistic missile infrastructure, but it is now aiming to expand its deep-strike attacks to critical factories, command hubs, storage sites and launchers.

De Vore told The i Paper: “Ballistic missiles production does depend on more sophisticated, bigger machine tools, so if you well and truly took out a ballistic missile factory you could disrupt missile production for a very considerable amount of time.”

However, at present, Ukraine doesn’t have sufficiently powerful warheads to take those out.

“Russians have some ballistic missile and storage sites that are closer to Ukraine and those are particularly hardened, they have concrete shielding on them,” De Vore said. “Even the good long-range Ukrainian missiles don’t have a specific concrete-penetrating warhead.”

Europe could help in this regard, he added, pointing to German Taurus missiles. “This missile has sophisticated bunker-penetrating warheads and immunity to jamming, which would enable Ukraine to destroy Russia’s hardened missile assembly plants.”

But so far Germany has refused to send any.

“If Germany will not provide Taurus missiles to Ukraine for use against targets in occupied Crimea, it seems highly unlikely that Berlin would authorise their use against targets inside the Russian Federation,” said Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Centre on Europe and Eurasia.

“There is also the range limitation. Taurus has a range of roughly 300 miles, while many important production facilities are located deeper inside Russia,” he added.

Trump holds the key capabilities

The US could provide Ukraine with software updates for its fighter jets, so they could hit mobile missile launchers, retired US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery suggested this summer.

The US has already approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAMs) to Ukraine, which can destroy distant high-value targets. However, at present they can only be utilised by Ukraine’s legacy Soviet aircraft, which cannot update targets in flight.

The US should prioritise “software upgrades enabling full integration of the missile with the F-16’s stores management and weapons delivery systems”, Montgomery said. “A small change in US policy would make a big difference in Ukraine’s fight for survival.”

Another key challenge is locating mobile missile launch sites. Key to this could be Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite system, which is already central to Kyiv’s battlefield command and control.

During a recent visit to the US, Zelensky reportedly sought a meeting with Musk on using Starlink to hunt ballistic missile launchers and other assets up to 200 kilometres inside Russia. However, during a meeting with Donald Trump, the President did not appear supportive of the plan, sources told , adding that they also doubted Musk would give his approval.

How Western allies can step up help

Even as Ukraine goes on the offensive, it – and its allies – must prepare its defences for the months ahead.

“European air defence begins in Ukraine, and it makes little sense to have capable interceptors gathering dust thousands of miles from any immediate threat,” said Coffey. “There are also European countries waiting in line to receive PAC-3 interceptors… It is difficult to justify a country such as Switzerland receiving new PAC-3 interceptors before Ukraine does.”

Ukraine’s allies could also purchase interceptors from South Korea or Japan, the only countries still with untapped reserves, De Vore suggested. Japan, in particular, already has a licence to produce Patriots.

Ukraine is set to receive the new Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG air defence systems, and France has pushed for using EU funds to purchase more of these and the Aster 30 missiles it uses. However, there are drawbacks.

“The key problem with Aster/SAMP-T is availability,” said De Vore, pointing to current production rates of 80-100 a year. “Furthermore, the Aster missile is key to French, British and Italian warships’ defence… Ukraine cannot even hope to receive the lion’s share of current Aster production.”

Western allies have also floated expanding SkyShield. This would see European combat aircraft conduct air patrols over western Ukraine, allowing Kyiv’s military to concentrate its air defences in the east and centre.

However, experts are sceptical of this. “Essentially, this would amount to establishing a no-fly zone,” said Coffey. “To enforce one effectively, you have to be prepared to suppress or destroy the adversary’s ground-based air defences… it could therefore mean the United States and other Nato countries directly targeting Russian air defence sites.”

De Vore said the political will for a move like this is still lacking. “No government beyond Ukraine has formally endorsed SkyShield, fearful of provoking a direct, escalating confrontation with Moscow.”

Nato could still establish an air defence system in Poland and Romania to engage Russian missiles or drones heading toward Nato territory, Coffey suggested. “This would protect major Ukrainian population centres such as Lviv, allowing Kyiv to reposition scarce air defence systems closer to the front.”

In the meantime, Ukraine must focus on strengthening its passive defences, including dispersing its high-value targets, hardening them and moving some underground. Stockpiling spare parts now so infrastructure can be rapidly repaired will also be key.

Ultimately, when it comes to defending against ballistic missiles, Ukraine is finding out that there is no silver bullet. This winter will likely be brutal. But through a mix of approaches, Ukraine and its allies can mitigate some of the problem, and help protect its people.