Sex, secrets and spies. It sounds like the plot of a Cold War thriller. But the allegations surrounding a prominent tech executive and a suspected Chinese intelligence operative – which it must be stressed remain unproven – are a reminder that one of espionage’s oldest weapons could still be as potent as ever.

Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, has acknowledged having an extramarital affair, amid reports that the woman with whom he had a relationship was gathering intelligence for Beijing. On Monday, China denied the spying claims, with a spokesperson for the ministry of foreign affairs saying they were “unsubstantiated” and a smear campaign against Beijing.

Nvidia, one of the world’s biggest companies, has launched an independent investigation, stressing there is no evidence that company secrets or national security were compromised.

Jensen Huang’s firm provides advanced computer chips used to build AI tools by firms including Amazon, Meta and Google. Whether Chinese intelligence exploited his relationship to gather valuable information remains unclear. But the allegations raise an important question: why, in an age of artificial intelligence, cyber espionage and sophisticated surveillance, do intelligence services still rely on that oldest of human vulnerabilities – sex?

Intelligence services understand that even clever and powerful people can become vulnerable when desire, vanity and emotional attachment overwhelm judgement. In fact, such people can make the best targets because they invariably believe: “That could never fool me.”

In espionage, we call it a honeytrap. The Russians call female intelligence agents trained in this practice “swallows”. The KGB perfected the art of sexual entrapment, using swallows – and male operatives called “ravens” – to cultivate, compromise and recruit intelligence targets.

The objective was not necessarily blackmail. Often, it was something more valuable: cultivating a willing source who believed the relationship was genuine. It is about intimacy and bonds of affection as much or more than just about sex.

Consider the extraordinary case of US Marine Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, assigned to guard the American Embassy in Moscow in the 1980s. Lonetree became romantically involved with Violetta Seina, a Soviet woman employed at the embassy. She introduced him to her supposed “Uncle Sasha”, who was in fact a KGB counterintelligence officer. What began as a clandestine romance developed into an intelligence relationship.

Lonetree provided sensitive information concerning American diplomatic facilities and personnel. He eventually realised he was in over his head and confessed. He was convicted of espionage in 1987 and sentenced to 30 years in prison (released later on parole, having expressed what appeared to be sincere contrition for his crimes).

The KGB did not need sophisticated technology or an elaborate cyber attack. It had exploited the loneliness and emotional vulnerability of a young Marine far from home.

Equally instructive were the infamous “Romeo spies” deployed by East Germany’s intelligence chief, Markus Wolf. Wolf was an astute operative and an accomplished leader of one of the West’s most professional intelligence adversaries: the HVA, the foreign intelligence arm of the Stasi. Western intelligence knew him as the “man without a face” because he carefully avoided having his photograph taken, so his adversaries could not target him as effectively.

The HVA worked closely with Soviet intelligence to target West Germany and key Nato facilities. They recognised that unmarried women working as secretaries and administrative assistants in West German government offices often had extraordinary access to sensitive information.

Wolf dispatched carefully selected male operatives under false identities to establish romantic relationships with them. Some relationships continued for years, with women passing highly classified documents to men they genuinely loved. One operative even participated in a staged marriage with his target, who only discovered the deception after her arrest.

Wolf understood something that remains central to intelligence recruitment: emotional dependence can be far more effective than threats. A victim who fears losing someone they love may volunteer information without ever experiencing overt coercion. Sometimes the intelligence service never needs to reveal its hand.

Hollywood honeytraps usually involve beautiful strangers, hidden cameras and immediate blackmail. Real intelligence operations are often considerably more patient and psychologically sophisticated.

An officer begins by studying the target. Are they lonely, insecure, ambitious, or unhappy in their marriage? Do they crave attention or recognition? Can personal affection be transformed into loyalty? The most dangerous phase may begin long before anyone requests classified information. Seemingly innocent conversations about colleagues, travel schedules and business decisions can still provide intelligence value.

In Jensen Huang’s case, the alleged Chinese interest is hardly surprising. Nvidia sits at the centre of the global competition for artificial intelligence supremacy. Its advanced semiconductor technology has become a strategic national security issue, particularly as Washington attempts to restrict China’s access to cutting-edge American chips.

Beijing’s intelligence services have powerful incentives to understand – and potentially influence – the people shaping those decisions. The public record has not established that Nvidia’s boss knowingly disclosed secrets or that Chinese intelligence influenced his decisions. But the controversy illustrates the continuing potential relevance of human intelligence in an increasingly technological world.

Today, social media, dating platforms and AI-generated identities offer intelligence services unprecedented opportunities to identify vulnerabilities, cultivate relationships and manipulate their targets. But the underlying tradecraft is as old as espionage itself.

Intelligence services do not always need to steal secrets from computers when they can persuade people to surrender them. The most dangerous vulnerability is often the person who believes they are “too smart for that” and could never be a target.

Sean Wiswesser is a former CIA senior operations officer and expert on Russian intelligence, espionage, and defence issues. He is the author of Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War (Naval Institute Press, 2026). All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.