Warnings of imminent escalation by Russia, in its overt war on Ukraine or its covert campaigns in Europe, have once again been increasing in intensity in recent weeks. Part of that increase is accounted for by a familiar pattern of Russian intimidation, amplified by Western media.

But it’s also true that the intelligence services of usually reliable European countries have been sounding the alarm over Russia’s possible next moves.

That includes renewed speculation over whether Russia will undertake mass mobilisation to build up the numbers in its military. This has been a constant topic of discussion among Russia-watchers for most of the war – but until now, it’s a step the Kremlin hasn’t been willing to take.

Russia’s military planners have a familiar balance to strike between the manpower needs of the war in Ukraine, including replacing the vast number of casualties that result from Russia’s traditional disregard for their own troops, and the public discontent that could result from more assertive measures to round people up for the military.

Until now, Russia has succeeded in avoiding the problem. From the Wagner Group trawling prisons for volunteers to organised recruitment targeting the rural poor and dispossessed ethnic minorities, Russia has found ways of draining its manpower relatively quietly. More and more foreigners, often from Africa and South Asia, have also been recruited by force or deception and sent to the front lines.

More formal foreign assistance has helped out at times of peak shortages, with North Korea contributing tens of thousands of soldiers in 2024.

But the wealthy, the well-connected, and urban populations – in other words, anybody with any political influence – have not really felt the brunt of the demands for more bodies to feed into the meat grinder. If that changes, Russia faces a risk of increased public dissatisfaction with the war.

That discontent has started to brew as a result of the war coming home to Russia in the form of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries and distribution depots, leading to petrol shortages and business losses. Mobilisation would stoke it still further.

When Russia announced a “partial mobilisation” in September 2022, it triggered a mass exodus. Russians who might not have disapproved of Russia’s genocidal onslaught on Ukraine, but felt it was a little too dangerous to be involved in it personally, fled the country in their hundreds of thousands in order to avoid being called up.

Some of those have trickled back as the sense of imminent danger of being forced into the military has passed. But any more overt moves towards bolstering Russia’s manpower numbers would have a similar effect.

That wouldn’t mean a meaningful political challenge to the Kremlin – after preparing for this moment for years, Russia has more than enough reserves of repressive capacity to deal with any public expressions of disgruntlement.

But Moscow would probably prefer if possible to preserve the widespread support for the war that it has enjoyed so far. A resurgence of public opposition, even minor, would undermine the fiction that Russia is winning that war, and its consequences are only felt in Ukraine.

Similarly, nobody seriously believes that political change could result from Russia’s performative “elections”, due to be held later in September. But Russia appears sometimes to take its pretence at democracy seriously enough to work hard at minimising the possibility of the elections being used as a means to express dissent, including a ban on the only anti-war party.

Such machinations led to suggestions that if Putin does decide to take the plunge and mobilise more of the population, whether overtly or by stealth, he’ll wait till after the “elections” to do so.

While it might appear that Russia would not need the same high numbers of recruits as it did in earlier phases of the war on Ukraine that saw wholesale use of Russian bodies to soak up Ukrainian bullets in so-called “meat wave“ attack, Ukrainian sources say that attempts to set up a strategic reserve from the surplus of manpower have been reversed, and they are being fed back into the front line.

And Russia still needs to plan ahead for future conflicts beyond Ukraine. The destruction of Ukraine is just the most immediate objective, and Putin has described clearly how the war there is just the current front line of a broader war to re-establish the Russia of his imaginings, at the expense of Russia’s neighbours in Europe.

For now, Russia is addressing its recruitment challenges more quietly, by steadily squeezing the categories of Russian citizens that are exempt from being called up, and making it harder to leave the country to avoid the army. Putin has denied reports of imminent mobilisation, calling them “a dog’s nonsense” and “an information attack on Russia”.

But Putin’s denials can often also be dismissed as nonsense. And Russia is showing no signs of being ready for peace either with Ukraine or Europe any time soon. That means more and more Russians will continue to find themselves sent into the firing line – with or without any formal declaration of mobilisation.