The outbreak of another pandemic as dangerous as Covid-19 is at the top of the Government’s risk register of threats to the UK, released last month. The experience of the last pandemic should mean that we would go into another with our eyes open and a network of experts ready to react to it.

But as budgets are tightened across Government, would the NHS be able to cope with a new pandemic? And having been through lockdowns – and seen some people flout restrictions – could we be expected to follow the rules like before?

So, are we ready for the next pandemic? Former deputy chief medical officer for England and behavioural scientist give their perspectives.

A pandemic caused by an unmitigated respiratory pathogen, such as influenza, is at the top of the UK’s 2026 national public risk register. The threat it could pose to our country is on a par with failure of our water infrastructure or loss of drinking water. Its impact would be as catastrophic as a civil nuclear incident or a total meltdown in our power supplies, and it is more likely to occur than either. And on the economic front, the last pandemic caused the biggest drop in GDP in a single quarter since records began.

As deputy chief medical officer for England during the pandemic, and in my work since, I have seen the preparations for the next pandemic. Effective pandemic prevention and rapid response preparedness is not simply a humanitarian crisis response, it’s an imperative for our society and economy – but it’s also an opportunity for both. The good news is that we are taking that opportunity. So much work has already been done: in board rooms, in Whitehall offices and in laboratories.

The most effective way to control a pandemic and return a society to health and to wealth is by making safe vaccines available, superfast. It’s a complex process well beyond what we normally consider health services. It needs practical, effective working across and between public and private organisations – local, national and global.

We need universities and research centres to work on new tests which can detect the new pathogen. We need skilled scientists on tap to evaluate new products. We need to recruit people from all our communities into robust clinical trials quickly. We need a medicines regulator who can assess new products for safety and effectiveness, just as thoroughly as usual but more rapidly. And we need to pre-plan with pharmaceutical companies for the rapid manufacture of vaccines and other medical countermeasures in giant quantities.

Above all, we need to know it all works when put to the test, together. Any one missing piece slows the speed at which vaccines can be realised and the pathogen hopefully halted.

The UK Covid public inquiry continues to highlight issues with the UK’s historic preparedness and planning for pandemics, alongside recognition of the huge public and professional dedication, loss and toil. For me, a less frequently recognised omission is a cultural conundrum – a lack of deep seated national self belief, alongside the absence of cross-sectoral operational normality, to use the science and systems we so clearly possess to launch a pre-emptive retaliatory strike against a pathogen before it properly takes hold.

In the six years since the start of the pandemic, the UK has made huge strides. Out of sight of most of us, a network of professionals has been strengthening our ability to spot and stop the next pandemic.

The government has updated the UK Biological Security Strategy, reinforcing biosecurity as an issue of national security. New bio-surveillance systems are being developed, recognising the importance of the intersection between human health, animal health and the environment. A huge crisis response drill, Exercise Pegasus, was undertaken in 2025 to test UK preparedness. Ministers across government and in COBRA were involved alongside emergency and community services. There are new Pandemic Institutes operating now at UK Universities such as Oxford and Liverpool. And there is a new UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) Health Risk Assessment specifically focusing on risks to human health.

Alongside the World Health Organisation, the UKHSA has developed a tool to help pharma companies, funders and researchers spot the gaps in our current armoury against likely new pathogens, and de-risk investment in possible products to tackle them. Essentially, it helps join effort across systems to deliver the most needed products.

Getting a new vaccine to the public quickly should be more straightforward too. The Medicines Healthcare Regulatory Authority, or MHRA, which oversees regulation of new products, is developing different types of assessment to keep pace with new technological development.

Importantly, a new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy was published this year by the Department of Health and Social Care, and new initiatives established to make it easier to safely and effectively data share for better patient protection.

So the good news is there has been a lot of really good progress.

But arguing for resources to ward off uncertainty is always difficult and after a crisis, teams from different sectors, operationally planning together, may be pulled away to other demands that are perceived as more urgent. For success, we need all the parts of the system aligned, understood, operationally ready and culturally working together. And we need them to do so routinely. This is a rare win-win-win opportunity.

So yes, we are better prepared and yes, we have learnt a lot. But the global risks for emerging infections are growing and we are still not realising all three opportunities – better pandemic preparedness, the translation and use of innovative health products and increasing economic prosperity.