Welcome to Trump’s America, The i Paper’s World Insight series presenting the sharpest, deepest thinking on an era-defining shift in history and politics, investigating how Donald Trump and his administration have changed the US and the world – and where we go from here.

•  Trump gave these voters $500 before the midterms. They’re still voting Democrat
Punch-drunk Trump is trapped in the first three stages of grief

The sweeping results of the US midterm elections had corks popping in Britain last week. Could it be, many wondered, that the curtain has closed on the dread era of Donald J. Trump? Is it no longer necessary to placate his impulses or pretend to respect him? Has Trumpism proved to be a malignant blip on history’s radar screen? Might the transatlantic “rupture” be mended?

As an American who feels attached to Europe (culturally, politically and genealogically), I hope so. And it’s a good bet that the new Democratic Congress will rectify some of Trump’s more egregious stances and policies. But I’m here mainly to crash the party with a warning.

If the United States had a parliamentary system, Trump of course would be gone. But it doesn’t. Trump is still president for another two years, and he is asserting his continued presence with unusual imperiousness.

This is a concerning sign for allies across the pond, since presidents enjoy much latitude in foreign affairs (which is why lame-duck presidents whose parties do poorly in midterms tend to turn in that direction).

What’s more, American politics have pivoted to something new during the Trump era in several dimensions, domestic and foreign. Even if a Democrat succeeds him in 2028, there’s little chance of reverting to the pre-2016 world. If Europeans (or certain allies in Asia) think they can go back to spending paltry sums for defence while basking under Washington’s security umbrella, they should think again.

While Democratic legislators – and theoretically, a future Democratic president – will be friendlier to allied leaders and more alert to their security needs, this attitude will only go so far. The midterm’s winning Democratic candidates displayed the vast breadth of the party, ranging from socialists in blue states to centrist religious figures in traditionally red states, but one issue they all embraced was “affordability”.

This means the new Congress will focus, above all, on restoring many of Trump’s ravaging cuts in health, housing, education and other social programmes. To the extent military matters enter the discussion at all (except for high-profile issues, such as aid to Ukraine), they will mainly pertain how to slash Trump’s $1.5trn defence budget – an outlandish 50 per cent increase over the previous year’s budget, which itself topped the largest budgets in US history.

In other words, as a result of Trump’s mindless overreach (he came up with $1.5trn in casual conversation, with no strategic framework or rationale), the new Congress will have to focus on where to cut – not on how to enlarge security commitments to others.

The midterms should assure the rest of the world that Trump is neither the face nor the soul of the American people. That said, no one should lapse into complacency. There’s no going back to the age when allies could assume Washington would take care of all problems.

When Republicans lost both houses of Congress in the 2006 midterms, President George W. Bush acknowledged his party’s “thumping”, fired secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld, and changed his strategy in the Iraq War (the disaster of which had been largely responsible for his party’s loss). When Democrats suffered a similar defeat in 2010, President Barack Obama called it a “shellacking” and toned down some of his policies.

By contrast, after this month’s even more astonishing setback, Trump acted as if there had been no elections – or at least as if they shouldn’t be seen as commentary on his record. He claimed Republicans lost because of poor candidates (ignoring that he’d handpicked several) and because his name wasn’t on the ballot, adding that, if it had been, he would have won “IN A LANDSLIDE” (ignoring that he’d said 60 times that people should vote as if his name were on the ballot – and judging from polls, many did).

At a day-after press conference, he talked about his East Wing ballroom, not even mentioning the election, until a reporter asked him about it. As if to hammer home his indifference to the most dramatic repudiation of an American president since the downfall of Richard Nixon, Trump elevated Stephen Miller to be White House chief of staff. Miller is the architect and enforcer of Trump’s most hardline and unpopular policies, mainly around harassing and deporting immigrants (not just undocumented ones), but also on sinking alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and abandoning Ukraine in favour of Russia.

As further amplification, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (previously “Secretary of Defense”) greeted Miller’s appointment on social media with a blaring slogan: “Stand. Fight. Defend the Republic” – presumably from the results of the Republic’s elections (which Trump is barely bothering to contest because, as one Republican put it, the Democratic margins were “too big to rig”).

At the time of writing, Hegseth’s fate is unknown. He is widely hated on Capitol Hill, inside the Pentagon and by the armed forces. He’s been the most gung-ho promoter of the Iran war and he’s fired or blocked the promotion of more than 80 generals and admirals, many for simply being Black or female – evidence, in his mind, that they’ve risen as high as they have purely because of affirmative-action policies, which he has abolished. Trump has stood up for him, but Hegseth wouldn’t be the first loyalist he’s pushed under the bus, and he may have to push him, if only to avoid an impeachment resolution. (The House, which still has a Republican majority, barely voted down a resolution on Tuesday. When the new Congress convenes in January, the House will certainly pass it, and even the Senate might muster the two-thirds majority needed to convict and remove him.)  

It’s a fair bet that January’s Democratic-controlled Congress will also pass bills to stiffen sanctions against Russia, loosen restrictions on military aid to Ukraine, place stricter conditions on support of any sort to Israel (unless, perhaps, a post-Netanyahu government drastically changes stripes), and bar outright withdrawals from major treaties and alliances.

Trump, of course, could veto all such bills. In some cases, both houses may well muster enough votes – two-thirds of the members present – to override a veto. In other cases, it will be useful for Democrats, in elections two years’ hence, to get the votes and the vetoes on the record.

In the meantime, international allies would do well to prepare for more pain. Emmanuel Macron’s quest for an “autonomous” European defence force, Mark Carney’s appeal for “middle powers” to band together and the continent-wide move to increase defence budgets – all in response to Vladimir Putin’s aggressiveness and to Trump’s growing unreliability as an allied leader willing to do anything about it – should move forward, even accelerate.